



# Western Australian Certificate of Education Examination, 2010

### **ANCIENT HISTORY**

Stage 3


**Document Booklet** 

#### **DOCUMENTS FOR QUESTION 1**

Unit 3A—Societies and change.

Set 1: Egypt. Dynasty 19: The Beginnings of the End—Ramses I, Seti I and Ramses II (c. 1295 BCE–1213 BCE).

#### Source 1:



Ramses II with his father, Seti I, facing the Abydos king list in the Temple of Seti I in Abydos.


#### Source 2:

His majesty has built himself a Residence whose name is 'Great of Victories'. It lies between Syria and Egypt, full of food and provisions. It follows the model of Upper Egyptian Thebes, its duration like that of Memphis, The Sun arises in its horizon and (even) sets within it.

Everyone has left his own town and settles in its neighbourhood.

This text is from an Egyptian scribe's writing about Ramses II's new administrative capital of Per-Ramses in the Delta.

#### Source 3:



This image shows a fallen colossal statue of Ramses II in the Ramesseum. This statue originally stood over six storeys high, one ear measured just over a metre, and it weighed in excess of 1000 tons. The monolithic block of limestone from which it was carved was quarried at Aswan, which is 400km south of Thebes, and it would have been floated down the Nile to its position in Ramses II's temple.

#### Source 4:

Now see (here), as for Matanazi my Brother's sister, (I) the King your brother knows her. Fifty is she? Never! She's sixty for sure! ... No one can produce medicine for her to have children. But of course, if the Sun-God and the Storm-God should will it ... But I will send a good magician and an able physician, and they can prepare some birth drugs for her (anyway).

A letter bearing Ramses II's reply to the Hittite king when he wrote requesting medical help for his sister.

## Set 2: Greece. Athenian democracy and Empire from the creation of the Delian League to the revolt of Samos in 440/39 BCE.

#### Source 1:

Perceiving this they departed, and the Spartans did not send out any to succeed them. They feared for those who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, they desired to be rid of the war against the Persians, and were satisfied of the competency of the Athenians for the position and of their friendship at the time toward themselves. The Athenians having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, determined which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, and which ships; their professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the King's country.

Thucydides, (Athenian general and historian), *The Peloponnesian War,* 1.95.7–96 1. (*c.*460–395 BCE).

#### Source 2:

Athens was clearly the ideal candidate for the leadership of the war against Persia. The present and future campaigns would demand a 'hegemon' (leader) who could conduct a vigorous naval offensive, and one who was sympathetic to the aspirations of the Ionians. The Athenians' two hundred ships, their Ionian kinship with many of the allies, and their support of the Ionians in 499 and in 479 made them the natural and very popular choice. But the big question was: of what should she become the leader?

Terry Buckley, Aspects of Greek History: 750–323 BC (1996), 189–190.

#### Source 3:

...but it was Aristides who, seizing the opportunity afforded by the discredit brought upon the Lacedaemonians by Pausanias, guided the public policy in the matter of the defection of the Ionian states from the alliance with Sparta. It follows that it was he who made the first assessment of tribute from the various allied states, ...and it was he who took the oath of offensive and defensive alliance with the Ionians, on which occasion they cast the masses of iron into the sea.

Aristotle, (philosopher and writer of a number of constitutional treatises), *Athenian Constitution*, 23.4–5 (written c. 330 BCE).

#### Source 4:

The Athenians were already well liked, thanks to the justice of Aristides and the affability shown by Cimon, but the grasping and overbearing conduct of Pausanias served to endear them (Athenians) to the Greeks even more. The allied commanders were constantly treated with arrogance and ill-temper by Pausanias, and their men were punished with floggings or by being forced to stand all day with an iron anchor on their shoulders. ...the generals and admirals of the Greek expedition, especially those of Chios, Samos, and Lesbos, approached Aristides and pressed him to accept the supreme command and rally around him the allies who had long wished to be quit of Sparta and to transfer their support to Athens.

Plutarch, (Greek biographer who lived mid 1st - mid 2nd centuries CE), Life of Aristides, 23.

### Set 3: Rome. Augustus from the first settlement of Augustus in 27 BCE to his death in 14 CE.

#### Source 1:

In this way, the power of both people and senate passed entirely into the hands of Augustus, and from this time (27 BCE), there was, strictly speaking, a monarchy; for monarchy would be the truest name for it, even if two or three people held the power jointly. ... The offices established by the laws, it is true, are maintained even now, except that of the censor; but the entire direction and administration is absolutely in accordance with the wishes of the one in power at the time. And yet, in order to preserve the appearance of having this authority not through their power but by virtue of the laws, the emperors have taken to themselves all the offices (including the titles) which under the Republic possessed great power with the consent of the people.

Dio Cassius, (Roman senator and writer of history, active in the early 3rd century CE),

\*\*Roman Histories 53.17.1ff.

#### Source 2:

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#### Source 3:



Golden coin of Augustus, 27 BCE, showing Augustus in official dress (a toga) on a magistrate's chair. The Latin legend on the coin reads 'He restored the laws and rights to the Roman people.'

Source 4:	
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#### **DOCUMENTS FOR QUESTION 2**

Unit 3B—People, ideas and events that shaped history.

Set 4: Egypt. The Amarna 'Revolution' from the accession of Amenhotep III (c. 1390 BCE) to the death of Horemheb (c. 1295 BCE).

#### Source 1:

Tutankhaten's advisers realised that action had to be taken to restore the confidence of the people in their pharaoh, and that one way to do this was to revive their traditional religion. It is unlikely that the young Tutankhaten — he was about nine when he came to the throne — was responsible for this restructuring: it was more likely to have originated with Ay, his chief adviser, and to a lesser extent with Horemheb, his general. We need also to be aware of the power of the priesthood of Amun, who made sure that they regained the political and religious supremacy they had lost under Akhenaten. For Amun to regain his position as the most important god, Tutankhaten could no longer live like an Atenist in an Amarna palace. With his court and officials, Tutankhaten had to leave the city of Akhetaten and reinstate Thebes as the capital. Moreover, he had to give the royal assent to the restoration by incorporating the name of Amun into his own and his wife's names — thus Tutankhaten became Tutankhamun and Ankhesenaten became Ankhesenamun. That there was no vendetta against the Atenist religion at this time indicates that the new regime was concerned with the maintenance of order and stability. (It was Horemheb who, later, was responsible for taking the Aten name from public buildings and monuments.) Howard Carter points out that the king's golden throne bears both Aten and Amum cartouches of the king. He suggests that the two religions probably co-existed....The relatively tolerant attitude towards the Atenist religion is illustrated by the objects buried with the king. The four sacred cobras or uraei placed under the diadem beneath the famous golden mask were inscribed with the names of the solar god: 'Re-of-the-horizon-who-rejoices-in-thehorizon-in-the-name-of-Re-the-father-who-comes-in-the-Aten'... It appears that it was Ay who had organised this traditional Osirian burial, would not risk burying his pharaoh without giving him the protection of the Aten.

From Justina Barnier, 'Tutankhamun'. In Diana Hennessy, *Studies in Ancient Egypt* (1993), 254–55.

#### Source 2:



This image shows the restoration *stele* of Tutankhamun, which was erected in the Temple of Amun at Karnak, in the Hypostyle Hall in front of Amenhotep III's pylon. The top of the *stele* has two almost identical scenes of the pharaoh's offerings to Amun-Re and Mut. It refers to Amun-Re as the 'Lord of the Thrones of the Two Lands, Lord of Heaven, King of Gods'. Amun-Re gives the king divine powers by touching him with his sceptre.

### Set 5: Greece. The Peloponnesian War from 440/39 BCE to the surrender of Athens in 404/3 BCE.

#### Source 1:

He (Pericles) also gave the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on their allies – the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally upon conduct and capital. Here they had no reason to be despondent. Apart from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies, and there were still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis... Then they had an army of thirteen thousand hoplites, besides sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on the battlements at Athens.

Thucydides, (Athenian general and historian), *The Peloponnesian War* 2.13. 2–6. (*c.*460–395 BCE).

<sup>1</sup>talents – A large unit of money

#### Source 2:

Athens was supreme and almost as untouchable by sea as the Spartans were on land. The irresistible force could not meet the immovable object. ... His (Pericles) strategy did not fail. It was not properly tried. It may also be noted that it should not be thought properly to have succeeded. When the Spartans appealed for peace in 425, it might seem that Pericles was proved right in arguing that the city would survive. Clearly the Athenians did have the chance in 425 to make what one might term a Periclean peace, and indeed they did make one of a sort in 421, unstable though it proved. But not even Pericles ...could have foreseen that the Spartan commander of the forces sent to deal with the Athenian occupation of Pylos would commit the appalling strategic blunder of putting part of his army on to the island of Sphacteria, whereby at a stroke the besiegers became the besieged, nor is it likely that Pericles was all that clearly aware of Sparta's peculiar problem of the decline in the numbers of Spartiates, whereby the besieged on Sphacteria were, demographically, too precious to lose. Athens biggest bit of luck was Sparta's folly. It made a Periclean 'survival' possible, but only by the strangest of chances.

G. Cawkwell, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War (1997), 44-45.

Set 6: Rome. The Julio-Claudians from the death of Augustus in 14 CE to the death of Nero in 68 CE.

#### Source 1:

[Claudius'] deepest devotion was reserved for Narcissus, his secretary, and Pallas, his treasurer, whom he encouraged the senate to honour with large gifts of money and the insignia of quaestors and praetors<sup>1</sup> as well. They were able to acquire such riches, by illegitimate means, that when one day Claudius complained how little cash was left in the imperial treasury, someone answered neatly that he would have heaps of money if only his two freemen took him into partnership.

Claudius fell so deeply under the influence of these freemen and wives that he seemed to be their servant rather than their emperor; and distributed honours, army commands, indulgences or punishments according to their wishes, however capricious<sup>2</sup>, seldom even aware of what he was about. ... He executed thirty-five senators and 300 Roman knights, with so little apparent concern that once, when a centurion reported that So-and-so the ex-consul was now duly despatched, and Claudius denied having ever given such a command, his freedmen satisfied him that the soldiers had done right not to wait for instructions before taking vengeance on an enemy of the emperor.

Suetonius, (belonged to the equestrian order, and wrote biographies of emperors; he was active from the mid-1st to mid-2nd centuries CE), *Life of Claudius* 28–89.

#### Source 2:

Claudius was a usurper who depended for support on army and people. Their demand for his installation meant more than the constitutional powers conferred... by the senate, which became a formal ratification of a unified power that Claudius already possessed. ... As a usurper, and because of a long-checked wish to take matters in hand, Claudius yielded to the temptation to intervene more than was acceptable to the senate. And in struggling to stay in power he had to destroy potential rivals and confer favours and power on groups and individuals outside the senate to a degree unknown before. ... It was...the ruthlessness of Claudius' efforts to stay in power that allowed the economic and social condition of the empire as a whole to continue to improve and stabilize itself.

B. Levick, Claudius (1990), 196.

**End of document** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> quaestors and praetors – Roman magistrates and members of the senate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> capricious – subject to a sudden change without reason

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Set 1

Source 1: Image adapted from: Rudolf Ochmann. (2006). Abydos Koenigsliste Sethos

Ramses. Retreived March, 2010, from Wikipedia website:

http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soubor:Abydos\_Koenigsliste\_Sethos\_Ramses.jpg

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**Source 2:** Kitchen, K.A. (1982). *Pharaoh Triumphant: the life and times of Ramesses II,* 

King of Egypt. Warminster: Aris and Phillips, p. 119.

**Source 3:** Image adapted from: Hajor. (2001). Fallen colossus of Ramses II;

Ramesseum, Luxor. Retrieved March, 2010, from

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Egypt.Ramesseum.01.jpg Licence under Creative Commons Attribution - Share Alike 3.0

**Source 4:** Kitchen, K.A. (1982). *Pharaoh Triumphant: the life and times of Ramesses II,* 

King of Egypt. Warminster: Aris and Phillips, p. 92.

Set 2

Source 1: Strassler, R. B. (Ed.) (1996). The Landmark Thucydides: a comprehensive

guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 52.

**Source 2:** Buckley, T. (1996). *Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC*. London:

Routledge. pp. 189-90.

**Source 3:** Kenyon, F. G. (Trans.). (n.d.). *Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution*. Retrieved

April, 2010, from: http://www.constitution.org/ari/athen 03.htm.

Source 4: Adapted from: Plutarch. & Scott-Kilvert, I. (Trans.). (1960). The Rise and Fall

of Athens: Nine Greek Lives by Plutarch. Harmondsworth: Penguin,

pp. 134-135.

Set 3

**Source 1:** Adapted from: Dio Cassius. Roman History. In Lewis, N. & Reinhold, M.

(1966). Roman Civilization Sourcebook II: The Empire. New York: Harper

Torchbooks, pp. 4–5.

Source 2: Adapted from: Augustus, Brunt, P. A., & Moore, J. M. (1967). Res Gestae

Divi Augusti: The achievements of the Divine Augustus. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, pp. 35–36.

**Source 3:** Image adapted from: VRoma Project. (n.d.). [Gold coin of Augustus].

Retrieved December, 2009, from

www.vroma.org/images/mcmanus images/aug coin republic2.jpg

Source 4: Adapted from: Syme, R. (1939). The Roman Revolution. London: Oxford

University Press, pp. 314–315.

Set 4

**Source 1:** Adapted from: Barnier, J. Tutankhamun. In Hennessy, D. (1993). Studies in

Ancient Egypt. Melbourne: Thomas Nelson. pp. 254-255.

Source 2: Image adapted from: Egyptian Museum, Cairo. (2007). The Restoration Stela

of Tutankhamun. Retrieved March, 2010, from:

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Restoration\_Stela.jpg licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic

Set 5

**Source 1:** Adapted from: Strassler, R. B. (Ed.). (1996). *The landmark Thucydides: A* 

comprehensive guide to the Peloponnesian war. New York: Simon &

Schuster. pp. 98–99.

Source 2: Adapted from: Thucydides., & Cawkwell, G. (1997) Thucydides and the

Peloponnesian War. London: Routledge, pp. 44-45.

Set 6

**Source 1:** Adapted from: Suetonius. & Graves, R. (Trans.). (1979). *The Twelve* 

Caesars. Harmondsworth: Penguin. pp. 204-205.

**Source 2:** Adapted from: Levick, B. (1990). *Claudius*. London: Batsford, p.196.

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